diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'crypt')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypt/Makefile | 77 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypt/README | 68 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypt/crypt.3 | 575 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypt/crypt.h | 24 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypt/crypt_blowfish.c | 907 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypt/crypt_blowfish.h | 27 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypt/crypt_gensalt.c | 124 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypt/crypt_gensalt.h | 30 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypt/ow-crypt.h | 43 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypt/wrapper.c | 551 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypt/x86.S | 203 |
11 files changed, 2629 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypt/Makefile b/crypt/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6531c7b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypt/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +# +# Written and revised by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> in 2000-2011. +# No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public +# domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software +# in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is +# Copyright (c) 2000-2011 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the +# general public under the following terms: +# +# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +# modification, are permitted. +# +# There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied. +# +# See crypt_blowfish.c for more information. +# + +CC = gcc +AS = $(CC) +LD = $(CC) +RM = rm -f +CFLAGS = -W -Wall -Wbad-function-cast -Wcast-align -Wcast-qual -Wmissing-prototypes -Wstrict-prototypes -Wshadow -Wundef -Wpointer-arith -O2 -fomit-frame-pointer -funroll-loops +ASFLAGS = -c +LDFLAGS = -s + +BLOWFISH_OBJS = \ + crypt_blowfish.o x86.o + +CRYPT_OBJS = \ + $(BLOWFISH_OBJS) crypt_gensalt.o wrapper.o + +TEST_OBJS = \ + $(BLOWFISH_OBJS) crypt_gensalt.o crypt_test.o + +TEST_THREADS_OBJS = \ + $(BLOWFISH_OBJS) crypt_gensalt.o crypt_test_threads.o + +EXTRA_MANS = \ + crypt_r.3 crypt_rn.3 crypt_ra.3 \ + crypt_gensalt.3 crypt_gensalt_rn.3 crypt_gensalt_ra.3 + +all: $(CRYPT_OBJS) + +check: crypt_test + ./crypt_test + +crypt_test: $(TEST_OBJS) + $(LD) $(LDFLAGS) $(TEST_OBJS) -o $@ + +crypt_test.o: wrapper.c ow-crypt.h crypt_blowfish.h crypt_gensalt.h + $(CC) -c $(CFLAGS) wrapper.c -DTEST -o $@ + +check_threads: crypt_test_threads + ./crypt_test_threads + +crypt_test_threads: $(TEST_THREADS_OBJS) + $(LD) $(LDFLAGS) $(TEST_THREADS_OBJS) -lpthread -o $@ + +crypt_test_threads.o: wrapper.c ow-crypt.h crypt_blowfish.h crypt_gensalt.h + $(CC) -c $(CFLAGS) wrapper.c -DTEST -DTEST_THREADS=4 -o $@ + +man: $(EXTRA_MANS) + +$(EXTRA_MANS): + echo '.so man3/crypt.3' > $@ + +crypt_blowfish.o: crypt_blowfish.h +crypt_gensalt.o: crypt_gensalt.h +wrapper.o: crypt.h ow-crypt.h crypt_blowfish.h crypt_gensalt.h + +.c.o: + $(CC) -c $(CFLAGS) $*.c + +.S.o: + $(AS) $(ASFLAGS) $*.S + +clean: + $(RM) crypt_test crypt_test_threads *.o $(EXTRA_MANS) core diff --git a/crypt/README b/crypt/README new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e95da23 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypt/README @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +This is an implementation of a password hashing method, provided via the +crypt(3) and a reentrant interface. It is fully compatible with +OpenBSD's bcrypt.c for prefix "$2b$", originally by Niels Provos and +David Mazieres. (Please refer to the included crypt(3) man page for +information on minor compatibility issues for other bcrypt prefixes.) + +I've placed this code in the public domain, with fallback to a +permissive license. Please see the comment in crypt_blowfish.c for +more information. + +You can use the provided routines in your own packages, or link them +into a C library. I've provided hooks for linking into GNU libc, but +it shouldn't be too hard to get this into another C library. Note +that simply adding this code into your libc is probably not enough to +make your system use the new password hashing algorithm. Changes to +passwd(1), PAM modules, or whatever else your system uses will likely +be needed as well. These are not a part of this package, but see +LINKS for a pointer to our tcb suite. + +Instructions on using the routines in one of the two common ways are +given below. It is recommended that you test the routines on your +system before you start. Type "make check" or "make check_threads" +(if you have the POSIX threads library), then "make clean". + + +1. Using the routines in your programs. + +The available interfaces are in ow-crypt.h, and this is the file you +should include. You won't need crypt.h. When linking, add all of the +C files and x86.S (you can compile and link it even on a non-x86, it +will produce no code in this case). + + +2. Building the routines into GNU C library. + +For versions 2.13 and 2.14 (and likely other nearby ones), extract the +library sources as usual. Apply the patch for glibc 2.14 provided in +this package. Enter crypt/ and rename crypt.h to gnu-crypt.h within +that directory. Copy the C sources, header, and assembly (x86.S) files +from this package in there as well (but be sure you don't overwrite the +Makefile). Configure, build, and install the library as usual. + +For versions 2.2 to 2.3.6 (and likely also for some newer ones), +extract the library sources and maybe its optional add-ons as usual. +Apply the patch for glibc 2.3.6 provided in this package. Enter +crypt/ and rename crypt.h to gnu-crypt.h within that directory. Copy +the C sources, header, and assembly (x86.S) files from this package in +there as well (but be sure you don't overwrite the Makefile). +Configure, build, and install the library as usual. + +For versions 2.1 to 2.1.3, extract the library sources and the crypt +and linuxthreads add-ons as usual. Apply the patch for glibc 2.1.3 +provided in this package. Enter crypt/sysdeps/unix/, and rename +crypt.h to gnu-crypt.h within that directory. Copy C sources, header, +and assembly (x86.S) files from this package in there as well (but be +sure you don't overwrite the Makefile). Configure, build, and install +the library as usual. + +Programs that want to use the provided interfaces will need to include +crypt.h (but not ow-crypt.h directly). By default, prototypes for the +new routines aren't defined (but the extra functionality of crypt(3) +is indeed available). You need to define _OW_SOURCE to obtain the new +routines as well. + +-- +Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> + +$Owl: Owl/packages/glibc/crypt_blowfish/README,v 1.10 2014/07/07 15:19:04 solar Exp $ diff --git a/crypt/crypt.3 b/crypt/crypt.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b4c0895 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypt/crypt.3 @@ -0,0 +1,575 @@ +.\" Written and revised by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> in 2000-2011. +.\" No copyright is claimed, and this man page is hereby placed in the public +.\" domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the man page +.\" in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the man page is +.\" Copyright (c) 2000-2011 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the +.\" general public under the following terms: +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted. +.\" +.\" There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied. +.\" +.\" This manual page in its current form is intended for use on systems +.\" based on the GNU C Library with crypt_blowfish patched into libcrypt. +.\" +.TH CRYPT 3 "July 7, 2014" "Openwall Project" "Library functions" +.ad l +.\" No macros in NAME to keep makewhatis happy. +.SH NAME +\fBcrypt\fR, \fBcrypt_r\fR, \fBcrypt_rn\fR, \fBcrypt_ra\fR, +\fBcrypt_gensalt\fR, \fBcrypt_gensalt_rn\fR, \fBcrypt_gensalt_ra\fR +\- password hashing +.SH SYNOPSIS +.B #define _XOPEN_SOURCE +.br +.B #include <unistd.h> +.sp +.in +8 +.ti -8 +.BI "char *crypt(const char *" key ", const char *" setting ); +.in -8 +.sp +.B #define _GNU_SOURCE +.br +.B #include <crypt.h> +.sp +.in +8 +.ti -8 +.BI "char *crypt_r(const char *" key ", const char *" setting ", struct crypt_data *" data ); +.in -8 +.sp +.B #define _OW_SOURCE +.br +.B #include <crypt.h> +.sp +.in +8 +.ti -8 +.BI "char *crypt_rn(const char *" key ", const char *" setting ", void *" data ", int " size ); +.ti -8 +.BI "char *crypt_ra(const char *" key ", const char *" setting ", void **" data ", int *" size ); +.ti -8 +.BI "char *crypt_gensalt(const char *" prefix ", unsigned long " count ", const char *" input ", int " size ); +.ti -8 +.BI "char *crypt_gensalt_rn(const char *" prefix ", unsigned long " count ", const char *" input ", int " size ", char *" output ", int " output_size ); +.ti -8 +.BI "char *crypt_gensalt_ra(const char *" prefix ", unsigned long " count ", const char *" input ", int " size ); +.ad b +.de crypt +.BR crypt , +.BR crypt_r , +.BR crypt_rn ", \\$1" +.ie "\\$2"" .B crypt_ra +.el .BR crypt_ra "\\$2" +.. +.de crypt_gensalt +.BR crypt_gensalt , +.BR crypt_gensalt_rn ", \\$1" +.ie "\\$2"" .B crypt_gensalt_ra +.el .BR crypt_gensalt_ra "\\$2" +.. +.SH DESCRIPTION +The +.crypt and +functions calculate a cryptographic hash function of +.I key +with one of a number of supported methods as requested with +.IR setting , +which is also used to pass a salt and possibly other parameters to +the chosen method. +The hashing methods are explained below. +.PP +Unlike +.BR crypt , +the functions +.BR crypt_r , +.BR crypt_rn " and" +.B crypt_ra +are reentrant. +They place their result and possibly their private data in a +.I data +area of +.I size +bytes as passed to them by an application and/or in memory they +allocate dynamically. Some hashing algorithms may use the data area to +cache precomputed intermediate values across calls. Thus, applications +must properly initialize the data area before its first use. +.B crypt_r +requires that only +.I data->initialized +be reset to zero; +.BR crypt_rn " and " crypt_ra +require that either the entire data area is zeroed or, in the case of +.BR crypt_ra , +.I *data +is NULL. When called with a NULL +.I *data +or insufficient +.I *size +for the requested hashing algorithm, +.B crypt_ra +uses +.BR realloc (3) +to allocate the required amount of memory dynamically. Thus, +.B crypt_ra +has the additional requirement that +.IR *data , +when non-NULL, must point to an area allocated either with a previous +call to +.B crypt_ra +or with a +.BR malloc (3) +family call. +The memory allocated by +.B crypt_ra +should be freed with +.BR free "(3)." +.PP +The +.crypt_gensalt and +functions compile a string for use as +.I setting +\- with the given +.I prefix +(used to choose a hashing method), the iteration +.I count +(if supported by the chosen method) and up to +.I size +cryptographically random +.I input +bytes for use as the actual salt. +If +.I count +is 0, a low default will be picked. +The random bytes may be obtained from +.BR /dev/urandom . +Unlike +.BR crypt_gensalt , +the functions +.BR crypt_gensalt_rn " and " crypt_gensalt_ra +are reentrant. +.B crypt_gensalt_rn +places its result in the +.I output +buffer of +.I output_size +bytes. +.B crypt_gensalt_ra +allocates memory for its result dynamically. The memory should be +freed with +.BR free "(3)." +.SH RETURN VALUE +Upon successful completion, the functions +.crypt and +return a pointer to a string containing the setting that was actually used +and a printable encoding of the hash function value. +The entire string is directly usable as +.I setting +with other calls to +.crypt and +and as +.I prefix +with calls to +.crypt_gensalt and . +.PP +The behavior of +.B crypt +on errors isn't well standardized. Some implementations simply can't fail +(unless the process dies, in which case they obviously can't return), +others return NULL or a fixed string. Most implementations don't set +.IR errno , +but some do. SUSv2 specifies only returning NULL and setting +.I errno +as a valid behavior, and defines only one possible error +.RB "(" ENOSYS , +"The functionality is not supported on this implementation.") +Unfortunately, most existing applications aren't prepared to handle +NULL returns from +.BR crypt . +The description below corresponds to this implementation of +.BR crypt " and " crypt_r +only, and to +.BR crypt_rn " and " crypt_ra . +The behavior may change to match standards, other implementations or +existing applications. +.PP +.BR crypt " and " crypt_r +may only fail (and return) when passed an invalid or unsupported +.IR setting , +in which case they return a pointer to a magic string that is +shorter than 13 characters and is guaranteed to differ from +.IR setting . +This behavior is safe for older applications which assume that +.B crypt +can't fail, when both setting new passwords and authenticating against +existing password hashes. +.BR crypt_rn " and " crypt_ra +return NULL to indicate failure. All four functions set +.I errno +when they fail. +.PP +The functions +.crypt_gensalt and +return a pointer to the compiled string for +.IR setting , +or NULL on error in which case +.I errno +is set. +.SH ERRORS +.TP +.B EINVAL +.crypt "" : +.I setting +is invalid or not supported by this implementation; +.sp +.crypt_gensalt "" : +.I prefix +is invalid or not supported by this implementation; +.I count +is invalid for the requested +.IR prefix ; +the input +.I size +is insufficient for the smallest valid salt with the requested +.IR prefix ; +.I input +is NULL. +.TP +.B ERANGE +.BR crypt_rn : +the provided data area +.I size +is insufficient for the requested hashing algorithm; +.sp +.BR crypt_gensalt_rn : +.I output_size +is too small to hold the compiled +.I setting +string. +.TP +.B ENOMEM +.B crypt +(original glibc only): +failed to allocate memory for the output buffer (which subsequent calls +would re-use); +.sp +.BR crypt_ra : +.I *data +is NULL or +.I *size +is insufficient for the requested hashing algorithm and +.BR realloc (3) +failed; +.sp +.BR crypt_gensalt_ra : +failed to allocate memory for the compiled +.I setting +string. +.TP +.B ENOSYS +.B crypt +(SUSv2): +the functionality is not supported on this implementation; +.sp +.BR crypt , +.B crypt_r +(glibc 2.0 to 2.0.1 only): +.de no-crypt-add-on +the crypt add-on is not compiled in and +.I setting +requests something other than the MD5-based algorithm. +.. +.no-crypt-add-on +.TP +.B EOPNOTSUPP +.BR crypt , +.B crypt_r +(glibc 2.0.2 to 2.1.3 only): +.no-crypt-add-on +.SH HASHING METHODS +The implemented hashing methods are intended specifically for processing +user passwords for storage and authentication; +they are at best inefficient for most other purposes. +.PP +It is important to understand that password hashing is not a replacement +for strong passwords. +It is always possible for an attacker with access to password hashes +to try guessing candidate passwords against the hashes. +There are, however, certain properties a password hashing method may have +which make these key search attacks somewhat harder. +.PP +All of the hashing methods use salts such that the same +.I key +may produce many possible hashes. +Proper use of salts may defeat a number of attacks, including: +.TP +1. +The ability to try candidate passwords against multiple hashes at the +price of one. +.TP +2. +The use of pre-hashed lists of candidate passwords. +.TP +3. +The ability to determine whether two users (or two accounts of one user) +have the same or different passwords without actually having to guess +one of the passwords. +.PP +The key search attacks depend on computing hashes of large numbers of +candidate passwords. +Thus, the computational cost of a good password hashing method must be +high \- but of course not too high to render it impractical. +.PP +All hashing methods implemented within the +.crypt and +interfaces use multiple iterations of an underlying cryptographic +primitive specifically in order to increase the cost of trying a +candidate password. +Unfortunately, due to hardware improvements, the hashing methods which +have a fixed cost become increasingly less secure over time. +.PP +In addition to salts, modern password hashing methods accept a variable +iteration +.IR count . +This makes it possible to adapt their cost to the hardware improvements +while still maintaining compatibility. +.PP +The following hashing methods are or may be implemented within the +described interfaces: +.PP +.de hash +.ad l +.TP +.I prefix +.ie "\\$1"" \{\ +"" (empty string); +.br +a string matching ^[./0-9A-Za-z]{2} (see +.BR regex (7)) +.\} +.el "\\$1" +.TP +.B Encoding syntax +\\$2 +.TP +.B Maximum password length +\\$3 (uses \\$4-bit characters) +.TP +.B Effective key size +.ie "\\$5"" limited by the hash size only +.el up to \\$5 bits +.TP +.B Hash size +\\$6 bits +.TP +.B Salt size +\\$7 bits +.TP +.B Iteration count +\\$8 +.ad b +.. +.ti -2 +.B Traditional DES-based +.br +This method is supported by almost all implementations of +.BR crypt . +Unfortunately, it no longer offers adequate security because of its many +limitations. +Thus, it should not be used for new passwords unless you absolutely have +to be able to migrate the password hashes to other systems. +.hash "" "[./0-9A-Za-z]{13}" 8 7 56 64 12 25 +.PP +.ti -2 +.B Extended BSDI-style DES-based +.br +This method is used on BSDI and is also available on at least NetBSD, +OpenBSD, and FreeBSD due to the use of David Burren's FreeSec library. +.hash _ "_[./0-9A-Za-z]{19}" unlimited 7 56 64 24 "1 to 2**24-1 (must be odd)" +.PP +.ti -2 +.B FreeBSD-style MD5-based +.br +This is Poul-Henning Kamp's MD5-based password hashing method originally +developed for FreeBSD. +It is currently supported on many free Unix-like systems, on Solaris 10 +and newer, and it is part of the official glibc. +Its main disadvantage is the fixed iteration count, which is already +too low for the currently available hardware. +.hash "$1$" "\e$1\e$[^$]{1,8}\e$[./0-9A-Za-z]{22}" unlimited 8 "" 128 "6 to 48" 1000 +.PP +.ti -2 +.BR "OpenBSD-style Blowfish-based" " (" bcrypt ) +.br +.B bcrypt +was originally developed by Niels Provos and David Mazieres for OpenBSD +and is also supported on recent versions of FreeBSD and NetBSD, +on Solaris 10 and newer, and on several GNU/*/Linux distributions. +It is, however, not part of the official glibc. +.PP +While both +.B bcrypt +and the BSDI-style DES-based hashing offer a variable iteration count, +.B bcrypt +may scale to even faster hardware, doesn't allow for certain optimizations +specific to password cracking only, doesn't have the effective key size +limitation, and uses 8-bit characters in passwords. +.hash "$2b$" "\e$2[abxy]\e$[0-9]{2}\e$[./A-Za-z0-9]{53}" 72 8 "" 184 128 "2**4 to 2**99 (current implementations are limited to 2**31 iterations)" +.PP +With +.BR bcrypt , +the +.I count +passed to +.crypt_gensalt and +is the base-2 logarithm of the actual iteration count. +.PP +.B bcrypt +hashes used the "$2a$" prefix since 1997. +However, in 2011 an implementation bug was discovered in crypt_blowfish +(versions up to 1.0.4 inclusive) affecting handling of password characters with +the 8th bit set. +Besides fixing the bug, +to provide for upgrade strategies for existing systems, two new prefixes were +introduced: "$2x$", which fully re-introduces the bug, and "$2y$", which +guarantees correct handling of both 7- and 8-bit characters. +OpenBSD 5.5 introduced the "$2b$" prefix for behavior that exactly matches +crypt_blowfish's "$2y$", and current crypt_blowfish supports it as well. +Unfortunately, the behavior of "$2a$" on password characters with the 8th bit +set has to be considered system-specific. +When generating new password hashes, the "$2b$" or "$2y$" prefix should be used. +(If such hashes ever need to be migrated to a system that does not yet support +these new prefixes, the prefix in migrated copies of the already-generated +hashes may be changed to "$2a$".) +.PP +.crypt_gensalt and +support the "$2b$", "$2y$", and "$2a$" prefixes (the latter for legacy programs +or configurations), but not "$2x$" (which must not be used for new hashes). +.crypt and +support all four of these prefixes. +.SH PORTABILITY NOTES +Programs using any of these functions on a glibc 2.x system must be +linked against +.BR libcrypt . +However, many Unix-like operating systems and older versions of the +GNU C Library include the +.BR crypt " function in " libc . +.PP +The +.BR crypt_r , +.BR crypt_rn , +.BR crypt_ra , +.crypt_gensalt and +functions are very non-portable. +.PP +The set of supported hashing methods is implementation-dependent. +.SH CONFORMING TO +The +.B crypt +function conforms to SVID, X/OPEN, and is available on BSD 4.3. +The strings returned by +.B crypt +are not required to be portable among conformant systems. +.PP +.B crypt_r +is a GNU extension. +There's also a +.B crypt_r +function on HP-UX and MKS Toolkit, but the prototypes and semantics differ. +.PP +.B crypt_gensalt +is an Openwall extension. +There's also a +.B crypt_gensalt +function on Solaris 10 and newer, but the prototypes and semantics differ. +.PP +.BR crypt_rn , +.BR crypt_ra , +.BR crypt_gensalt_rn , +and +.B crypt_gensalt_ra +are Openwall extensions. +.SH HISTORY +A rotor-based +.B crypt +function appeared in Version 6 AT&T UNIX. +The "traditional" +.B crypt +first appeared in Version 7 AT&T UNIX. +.PP +The +.B crypt_r +function was introduced during glibc 2.0 development. +.SH BUGS +The return values of +.BR crypt " and " crypt_gensalt +point to static buffers that are overwritten by subsequent calls. +These functions are not thread-safe. +.RB ( crypt +on recent versions of Solaris uses thread-specific data and actually is +thread-safe.) +.PP +The strings returned by certain other implementations of +.B crypt +on error may be stored in read-only locations or only initialized once, +which makes it unsafe to always attempt to zero out the buffer normally +pointed to by the +.B crypt +return value as it would otherwise be preferable for security reasons. +The problem could be avoided with the use of +.BR crypt_r , +.BR crypt_rn , +or +.B crypt_ra +where the application has full control over output buffers of these functions +(and often over some of their private data as well). +Unfortunately, the functions aren't (yet?) available on platforms where +.B crypt +has this undesired property. +.PP +Applications using the thread-safe +.B crypt_r +need to allocate address space for the large (over 128 KB) +.I struct crypt_data +structure. Each thread needs a separate instance of the structure. The +.B crypt_r +interface makes it impossible to implement a hashing algorithm which +would need to keep an even larger amount of private data, without breaking +binary compatibility. +.B crypt_ra +allows for dynamically increasing the allocation size as required by the +hashing algorithm that is actually used. Unfortunately, +.B crypt_ra +is even more non-portable than +.BR crypt_r . +.PP +Multi-threaded applications or library functions which are meant to be +thread-safe should use +.BR crypt_gensalt_rn " or " crypt_gensalt_ra +rather than +.BR crypt_gensalt . +.SH SEE ALSO +.BR login (1), +.BR passwd (1), +.BR crypto (3), +.BR encrypt (3), +.BR free (3), +.BR getpass (3), +.BR getpwent (3), +.BR malloc (3), +.BR realloc (3), +.BR shadow (3), +.BR passwd (5), +.BR shadow (5), +.BR regex (7), +.BR pam (8) +.sp +Niels Provos and David Mazieres. A Future-Adaptable Password Scheme. +Proceedings of the 1999 USENIX Annual Technical Conference, June 1999. +.br +http://www.usenix.org/events/usenix99/provos.html +.sp +Robert Morris and Ken Thompson. Password Security: A Case History. +Unix Seventh Edition Manual, Volume 2, April 1978. +.br +http://plan9.bell-labs.com/7thEdMan/vol2/password diff --git a/crypt/crypt.h b/crypt/crypt.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..12e6705 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypt/crypt.h @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +/* + * Written by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> in 2000-2002. + * No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public + * domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software + * in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is + * Copyright (c) 2000-2002 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the + * general public under the following terms: + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted. + * + * There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied. + * + * See crypt_blowfish.c for more information. + */ + +#include <gnu-crypt.h> + +#if defined(_OW_SOURCE) || defined(__USE_OW) +#define __SKIP_GNU +#undef __SKIP_OW +#include <ow-crypt.h> +#undef __SKIP_GNU +#endif diff --git a/crypt/crypt_blowfish.c b/crypt/crypt_blowfish.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9d3f3be --- /dev/null +++ b/crypt/crypt_blowfish.c @@ -0,0 +1,907 @@ +/* + * The crypt_blowfish homepage is: + * + * http://www.openwall.com/crypt/ + * + * This code comes from John the Ripper password cracker, with reentrant + * and crypt(3) interfaces added, but optimizations specific to password + * cracking removed. + * + * Written by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> in 1998-2014. + * No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public + * domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software + * in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is + * Copyright (c) 1998-2014 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the + * general public under the following terms: + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted. + * + * There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied. + * + * It is my intent that you should be able to use this on your system, + * as part of a software package, or anywhere else to improve security, + * ensure compatibility, or for any other purpose. I would appreciate + * it if you give credit where it is due and keep your modifications in + * the public domain as well, but I don't require that in order to let + * you place this code and any modifications you make under a license + * of your choice. + * + * This implementation is fully compatible with OpenBSD's bcrypt.c for prefix + * "$2b$", originally by Niels Provos <provos at citi.umich.edu>, and it uses + * some of his ideas. The password hashing algorithm was designed by David + * Mazieres <dm at lcs.mit.edu>. For information on the level of + * compatibility for bcrypt hash prefixes other than "$2b$", please refer to + * the comments in BF_set_key() below and to the included crypt(3) man page. + * + * There's a paper on the algorithm that explains its design decisions: + * + * http://www.usenix.org/events/usenix99/provos.html + * + * Some of the tricks in BF_ROUND might be inspired by Eric Young's + * Blowfish library (I can't be sure if I would think of something if I + * hadn't seen his code). + */ + +#include <string.h> + +#include <errno.h> +#ifndef __set_errno +#define __set_errno(val) errno = (val) +#endif + +/* Just to make sure the prototypes match the actual definitions */ +#include "crypt_blowfish.h" + +#ifdef __i386__ +#define BF_ASM 1 +#define BF_SCALE 1 +#elif defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__alpha__) || defined(__hppa__) +#define BF_ASM 0 +#define BF_SCALE 1 +#else +#define BF_ASM 0 +#define BF_SCALE 0 +#endif + +typedef unsigned int BF_word; +typedef signed int BF_word_signed; + +/* Number of Blowfish rounds, this is also hardcoded into a few places */ +#define BF_N 16 + +typedef BF_word BF_key[BF_N + 2]; + +typedef struct { + BF_word S[4][0x100]; + BF_key P; +} BF_ctx; + +/* + * Magic IV for 64 Blowfish encryptions that we do at the end. + * The string is "OrpheanBeholderScryDoubt" on big-endian. + */ +static BF_word BF_magic_w[6] = { + 0x4F727068, 0x65616E42, 0x65686F6C, + 0x64657253, 0x63727944, 0x6F756274 +}; + +/* + * P-box and S-box tables initialized with digits of Pi. + */ +static BF_ctx BF_init_state = { + { + { + 0xd1310ba6, 0x98dfb5ac, 0x2ffd72db, 0xd01adfb7, + 0xb8e1afed, 0x6a267e96, 0xba7c9045, 0xf12c7f99, + 0x24a19947, 0xb3916cf7, 0x0801f2e2, 0x858efc16, + 0x636920d8, 0x71574e69, 0xa458fea3, 0xf4933d7e, + 0x0d95748f, 0x728eb658, 0x718bcd58, 0x82154aee, + 0x7b54a41d, 0xc25a59b5, 0x9c30d539, 0x2af26013, + 0xc5d1b023, 0x286085f0, 0xca417918, 0xb8db38ef, + 0x8e79dcb0, 0x603a180e, 0x6c9e0e8b, 0xb01e8a3e, + 0xd71577c1, 0xbd314b27, 0x78af2fda, 0x55605c60, + 0xe65525f3, 0xaa55ab94, 0x57489862, 0x63e81440, + 0x55ca396a, 0x2aab10b6, 0xb4cc5c34, 0x1141e8ce, + 0xa15486af, 0x7c72e993, 0xb3ee1411, 0x636fbc2a, + 0x2ba9c55d, 0x741831f6, 0xce5c3e16, 0x9b87931e, + 0xafd6ba33, 0x6c24cf5c, 0x7a325381, 0x28958677, + 0x3b8f4898, 0x6b4bb9af, 0xc4bfe81b, 0x66282193, + 0x61d809cc, 0xfb21a991, 0x487cac60, 0x5dec8032, + 0xef845d5d, 0xe98575b1, 0xdc262302, 0xeb651b88, + 0x23893e81, 0xd396acc5, 0x0f6d6ff3, 0x83f44239, + 0x2e0b4482, 0xa4842004, 0x69c8f04a, 0x9e1f9b5e, + 0x21c66842, 0xf6e96c9a, 0x670c9c61, 0xabd388f0, + 0x6a51a0d2, 0xd8542f68, 0x960fa728, 0xab5133a3, + 0x6eef0b6c, 0x137a3be4, 0xba3bf050, 0x7efb2a98, + 0xa1f1651d, 0x39af0176, 0x66ca593e, 0x82430e88, + 0x8cee8619, 0x456f9fb4, 0x7d84a5c3, 0x3b8b5ebe, + 0xe06f75d8, 0x85c12073, 0x401a449f, 0x56c16aa6, + 0x4ed3aa62, 0x363f7706, 0x1bfedf72, 0x429b023d, + 0x37d0d724, 0xd00a1248, 0xdb0fead3, 0x49f1c09b, + 0x075372c9, 0x80991b7b, 0x25d479d8, 0xf6e8def7, + 0xe3fe501a, 0xb6794c3b, 0x976ce0bd, 0x04c006ba, + 0xc1a94fb6, 0x409f60c4, 0x5e5c9ec2, 0x196a2463, + 0x68fb6faf, 0x3e6c53b5, 0x1339b2eb, 0x3b52ec6f, + 0x6dfc511f, 0x9b30952c, 0xcc814544, 0xaf5ebd09, + 0xbee3d004, 0xde334afd, 0x660f2807, 0x192e4bb3, + 0xc0cba857, 0x45c8740f, 0xd20b5f39, 0xb9d3fbdb, + 0x5579c0bd, 0x1a60320a, 0xd6a100c6, 0x402c7279, + 0x679f25fe, 0xfb1fa3cc, 0x8ea5e9f8, 0xdb3222f8, + 0x3c7516df, 0xfd616b15, 0x2f501ec8, 0xad0552ab, + 0x323db5fa, 0xfd238760, 0x53317b48, 0x3e00df82, + 0x9e5c57bb, 0xca6f8ca0, 0x1a87562e, 0xdf1769db, + 0xd542a8f6, 0x287effc3, 0xac6732c6, 0x8c4f5573, + 0x695b27b0, 0xbbca58c8, 0xe1ffa35d, 0xb8f011a0, + 0x10fa3d98, 0xfd2183b8, 0x4afcb56c, 0x2dd1d35b, + 0x9a53e479, 0xb6f84565, 0xd28e49bc, 0x4bfb9790, + 0xe1ddf2da, 0xa4cb7e33, 0x62fb1341, 0xcee4c6e8, + 0xef20cada, 0x36774c01, 0xd07e9efe, 0x2bf11fb4, + 0x95dbda4d, 0xae909198, 0xeaad8e71, 0x6b93d5a0, + 0xd08ed1d0, 0xafc725e0, 0x8e3c5b2f, 0x8e7594b7, + 0x8ff6e2fb, 0xf2122b64, 0x8888b812, 0x900df01c, + 0x4fad5ea0, 0x688fc31c, 0xd1cff191, 0xb3a8c1ad, + 0x2f2f2218, 0xbe0e1777, 0xea752dfe, 0x8b021fa1, + 0xe5a0cc0f, 0xb56f74e8, 0x18acf3d6, 0xce89e299, + 0xb4a84fe0, 0xfd13e0b7, 0x7cc43b81, 0xd2ada8d9, + 0x165fa266, 0x80957705, 0x93cc7314, 0x211a1477, + 0xe6ad2065, 0x77b5fa86, 0xc75442f5, 0xfb9d35cf, + 0xebcdaf0c, 0x7b3e89a0, 0xd6411bd3, 0xae1e7e49, + 0x00250e2d, 0x2071b35e, 0x226800bb, 0x57b8e0af, + 0x2464369b, 0xf009b91e, 0x5563911d, 0x59dfa6aa, + 0x78c14389, 0xd95a537f, 0x207d5ba2, 0x02e5b9c5, + 0x83260376, 0x6295cfa9, 0x11c81968, 0x4e734a41, + 0xb3472dca, 0x7b14a94a, 0x1b510052, 0x9a532915, + 0xd60f573f, 0xbc9bc6e4, 0x2b60a476, 0x81e67400, + 0x08ba6fb5, 0x571be91f, 0xf296ec6b, 0x2a0dd915, + 0xb6636521, 0xe7b9f9b6, 0xff34052e, 0xc5855664, + 0x53b02d5d, 0xa99f8fa1, 0x08ba4799, 0x6e85076a + }, { + 0x4b7a70e9, 0xb5b32944, 0xdb75092e, 0xc4192623, + 0xad6ea6b0, 0x49a7df7d, 0x9cee60b8, 0x8fedb266, + 0xecaa8c71, 0x699a17ff, 0x5664526c, 0xc2b19ee1, + 0x193602a5, 0x75094c29, 0xa0591340, 0xe4183a3e, + 0x3f54989a, 0x5b429d65, 0x6b8fe4d6, 0x99f73fd6, + 0xa1d29c07, 0xefe830f5, 0x4d2d38e6, 0xf0255dc1, + 0x4cdd2086, 0x8470eb26, 0x6382e9c6, 0x021ecc5e, + 0x09686b3f, 0x3ebaefc9, 0x3c971814, 0x6b6a70a1, + 0x687f3584, 0x52a0e286, 0xb79c5305, 0xaa500737, + 0x3e07841c, 0x7fdeae5c, 0x8e7d44ec, 0x5716f2b8, + 0xb03ada37, 0xf0500c0d, 0xf01c1f04, 0x0200b3ff, + 0xae0cf51a, 0x3cb574b2, 0x25837a58, 0xdc0921bd, + 0xd19113f9, 0x7ca92ff6, 0x94324773, 0x22f54701, + 0x3ae5e581, 0x37c2dadc, 0xc8b57634, 0x9af3dda7, + 0xa9446146, 0x0fd0030e, 0xecc8c73e, 0xa4751e41, + 0xe238cd99, 0x3bea0e2f, 0x3280bba1, 0x183eb331, + 0x4e548b38, 0x4f6db908, 0x6f420d03, 0xf60a04bf, + 0x2cb81290, 0x24977c79, 0x5679b072, 0xbcaf89af, + 0xde9a771f, 0xd9930810, 0xb38bae12, 0xdccf3f2e, + 0x5512721f, 0x2e6b7124, 0x501adde6, 0x9f84cd87, + 0x7a584718, 0x7408da17, 0xbc9f9abc, 0xe94b7d8c, + 0xec7aec3a, 0xdb851dfa, 0x63094366, 0xc464c3d2, + 0xef1c1847, 0x3215d908, 0xdd433b37, 0x24c2ba16, + 0x12a14d43, 0x2a65c451, 0x50940002, 0x133ae4dd, + 0x71dff89e, 0x10314e55, 0x81ac77d6, 0x5f11199b, + 0x043556f1, 0xd7a3c76b, 0x3c11183b, 0x5924a509, + 0xf28fe6ed, 0x97f1fbfa, 0x9ebabf2c, 0x1e153c6e, + 0x86e34570, 0xeae96fb1, 0x860e5e0a, 0x5a3e2ab3, + 0x771fe71c, 0x4e3d06fa, 0x2965dcb9, 0x99e71d0f, + 0x803e89d6, 0x5266c825, 0x2e4cc978, 0x9c10b36a, + 0xc6150eba, 0x94e2ea78, 0xa5fc3c53, 0x1e0a2df4, + 0xf2f74ea7, 0x361d2b3d, 0x1939260f, 0x19c27960, + 0x5223a708, 0xf71312b6, 0xebadfe6e, 0xeac31f66, + 0xe3bc4595, 0xa67bc883, 0xb17f37d1, 0x018cff28, + 0xc332ddef, 0xbe6c5aa5, 0x65582185, 0x68ab9802, + 0xeecea50f, 0xdb2f953b, 0x2aef7dad, 0x5b6e2f84, + 0x1521b628, 0x29076170, 0xecdd4775, 0x619f1510, + 0x13cca830, 0xeb61bd96, 0x0334fe1e, 0xaa0363cf, + 0xb5735c90, 0x4c70a239, 0xd59e9e0b, 0xcbaade14, + 0xeecc86bc, 0x60622ca7, 0x9cab5cab, 0xb2f3846e, + 0x648b1eaf, 0x19bdf0ca, 0xa02369b9, 0x655abb50, + 0x40685a32, 0x3c2ab4b3, 0x319ee9d5, 0xc021b8f7, + 0x9b540b19, 0x875fa099, 0x95f7997e, 0x623d7da8, + 0xf837889a, 0x97e32d77, 0x11ed935f, 0x16681281, + 0x0e358829, 0xc7e61fd6, 0x96dedfa1, 0x7858ba99, + 0x57f584a5, 0x1b227263, 0x9b83c3ff, 0x1ac24696, + 0xcdb30aeb, 0x532e3054, 0x8fd948e4, 0x6dbc3128, + 0x58ebf2ef, 0x34c6ffea, 0xfe28ed61, 0xee7c3c73, + 0x5d4a14d9, 0xe864b7e3, 0x42105d14, 0x203e13e0, + 0x45eee2b6, 0xa3aaabea, 0xdb6c4f15, 0xfacb4fd0, + 0xc742f442, 0xef6abbb5, 0x654f3b1d, 0x41cd2105, + 0xd81e799e, 0x86854dc7, 0xe44b476a, 0x3d816250, + 0xcf62a1f2, 0x5b8d2646, 0xfc8883a0, 0xc1c7b6a3, + 0x7f1524c3, 0x69cb7492, 0x47848a0b, 0x5692b285, + 0x095bbf00, 0xad19489d, 0x1462b174, 0x23820e00, + 0x58428d2a, 0x0c55f5ea, 0x1dadf43e, 0x233f7061, + 0x3372f092, 0x8d937e41, 0xd65fecf1, 0x6c223bdb, + 0x7cde3759, 0xcbee7460, 0x4085f2a7, 0xce77326e, + 0xa6078084, 0x19f8509e, 0xe8efd855, 0x61d99735, + 0xa969a7aa, 0xc50c06c2, 0x5a04abfc, 0x800bcadc, + 0x9e447a2e, 0xc3453484, 0xfdd56705, 0x0e1e9ec9, + 0xdb73dbd3, 0x105588cd, 0x675fda79, 0xe3674340, + 0xc5c43465, 0x713e38d8, 0x3d28f89e, 0xf16dff20, + 0x153e21e7, 0x8fb03d4a, 0xe6e39f2b, 0xdb83adf7 + }, { + 0xe93d5a68, 0x948140f7, 0xf64c261c, 0x94692934, + 0x411520f7, 0x7602d4f7, 0xbcf46b2e, 0xd4a20068, + 0xd4082471, 0x3320f46a, 0x43b7d4b7, 0x500061af, + 0x1e39f62e, 0x97244546, 0x14214f74, 0xbf8b8840, + 0x4d95fc1d, 0x96b591af, 0x70f4ddd3, 0x66a02f45, + 0xbfbc09ec, 0x03bd9785, 0x7fac6dd0, 0x31cb8504, + 0x96eb27b3, 0x55fd3941, 0xda2547e6, 0xabca0a9a, + 0x28507825, 0x530429f4, 0x0a2c86da, 0xe9b66dfb, + 0x68dc1462, 0xd7486900, 0x680ec0a4, 0x27a18dee, + 0x4f3ffea2, 0xe887ad8c, 0xb58ce006, 0x7af4d6b6, + 0xaace1e7c, 0xd3375fec, 0xce78a399, 0x406b2a42, + 0x20fe9e35, 0xd9f385b9, 0xee39d7ab, 0x3b124e8b, + 0x1dc9faf7, 0x4b6d1856, 0x26a36631, 0xeae397b2, + 0x3a6efa74, 0xdd5b4332, 0x6841e7f7, 0xca7820fb, + 0xfb0af54e, 0xd8feb397, 0x454056ac, 0xba489527, + 0x55533a3a, 0x20838d87, 0xfe6ba9b7, 0xd096954b, + 0x55a867bc, 0xa1159a58, 0xcca92963, 0x99e1db33, + 0xa62a4a56, 0x3f3125f9, 0x5ef47e1c, 0x9029317c, + 0xfdf8e802, 0x04272f70, 0x80bb155c, 0x05282ce3, + 0x95c11548, 0xe4c66d22, 0x48c1133f, 0xc70f86dc, + 0x07f9c9ee, 0x41041f0f, 0x404779a4, 0x5d886e17, + 0x325f51eb, 0xd59bc0d1, 0xf2bcc18f, 0x41113564, + 0x257b7834, 0x602a9c60, 0xdff8e8a3, 0x1f636c1b, + 0x0e12b4c2, 0x02e1329e, 0xaf664fd1, 0xcad18115, + 0x6b2395e0, 0x333e92e1, 0x3b240b62, 0xeebeb922, + 0x85b2a20e, 0xe6ba0d99, 0xde720c8c, 0x2da2f728, + 0xd0127845, 0x95b794fd, 0x647d0862, 0xe7ccf5f0, + 0x5449a36f, 0x877d48fa, 0xc39dfd27, 0xf33e8d1e, + 0x0a476341, 0x992eff74, 0x3a6f6eab, 0xf4f8fd37, + 0xa812dc60, 0xa1ebddf8, 0x991be14c, 0xdb6e6b0d, + 0xc67b5510, 0x6d672c37, 0x2765d43b, 0xdcd0e804, + 0xf1290dc7, 0xcc00ffa3, 0xb5390f92, 0x690fed0b, + 0x667b9ffb, 0xcedb7d9c, 0xa091cf0b, 0xd9155ea3, + 0xbb132f88, 0x515bad24, 0x7b9479bf, 0x763bd6eb, + 0x37392eb3, 0xcc115979, 0x8026e297, 0xf42e312d, + 0x6842ada7, 0xc66a2b3b, 0x12754ccc, 0x782ef11c, + 0x6a124237, 0xb79251e7, 0x06a1bbe6, 0x4bfb6350, + 0x1a6b1018, 0x11caedfa, 0x3d25bdd8, 0xe2e1c3c9, + 0x44421659, 0x0a121386, 0xd90cec6e, 0xd5abea2a, + 0x64af674e, 0xda86a85f, 0xbebfe988, 0x64e4c3fe, + 0x9dbc8057, 0xf0f7c086, 0x60787bf8, 0x6003604d, + 0xd1fd8346, 0xf6381fb0, 0x7745ae04, 0xd736fccc, + 0x83426b33, 0xf01eab71, 0xb0804187, 0x3c005e5f, + 0x77a057be, 0xbde8ae24, 0x55464299, 0xbf582e61, + 0x4e58f48f, 0xf2ddfda2, 0xf474ef38, 0x8789bdc2, + 0x5366f9c3, 0xc8b38e74, 0xb475f255, 0x46fcd9b9, + 0x7aeb2661, 0x8b1ddf84, 0x846a0e79, 0x915f95e2, + 0x466e598e, 0x20b45770, 0x8cd55591, 0xc902de4c, + 0xb90bace1, 0xbb8205d0, 0x11a86248, 0x7574a99e, + 0xb77f19b6, 0xe0a9dc09, 0x662d09a1, 0xc4324633, + 0xe85a1f02, 0x09f0be8c, 0x4a99a025, 0x1d6efe10, + 0x1ab93d1d, 0x0ba5a4df, 0xa186f20f, 0x2868f169, + 0xdcb7da83, 0x573906fe, 0xa1e2ce9b, 0x4fcd7f52, + 0x50115e01, 0xa70683fa, 0xa002b5c4, 0x0de6d027, + 0x9af88c27, 0x773f8641, 0xc3604c06, 0x61a806b5, + 0xf0177a28, 0xc0f586e0, 0x006058aa, 0x30dc7d62, + 0x11e69ed7, 0x2338ea63, 0x53c2dd94, 0xc2c21634, + 0xbbcbee56, 0x90bcb6de, 0xebfc7da1, 0xce591d76, + 0x6f05e409, 0x4b7c0188, 0x39720a3d, 0x7c927c24, + 0x86e3725f, 0x724d9db9, 0x1ac15bb4, 0xd39eb8fc, + 0xed545578, 0x08fca5b5, 0xd83d7cd3, 0x4dad0fc4, + 0x1e50ef5e, 0xb161e6f8, 0xa28514d9, 0x6c51133c, + 0x6fd5c7e7, 0x56e14ec4, 0x362abfce, 0xddc6c837, + 0xd79a3234, 0x92638212, 0x670efa8e, 0x406000e0 + }, { + 0x3a39ce37, 0xd3faf5cf, 0xabc27737, 0x5ac52d1b, + 0x5cb0679e, 0x4fa33742, 0xd3822740, 0x99bc9bbe, + 0xd5118e9d, 0xbf0f7315, 0xd62d1c7e, 0xc700c47b, + 0xb78c1b6b, 0x21a19045, 0xb26eb1be, 0x6a366eb4, + 0x5748ab2f, 0xbc946e79, 0xc6a376d2, 0x6549c2c8, + 0x530ff8ee, 0x468dde7d, 0xd5730a1d, 0x4cd04dc6, + 0x2939bbdb, 0xa9ba4650, 0xac9526e8, 0xbe5ee304, + 0xa1fad5f0, 0x6a2d519a, 0x63ef8ce2, 0x9a86ee22, + 0xc089c2b8, 0x43242ef6, 0xa51e03aa, 0x9cf2d0a4, + 0x83c061ba, 0x9be96a4d, 0x8fe51550, 0xba645bd6, + 0x2826a2f9, 0xa73a3ae1, 0x4ba99586, 0xef5562e9, + 0xc72fefd3, 0xf752f7da, 0x3f046f69, 0x77fa0a59, + 0x80e4a915, 0x87b08601, 0x9b09e6ad, 0x3b3ee593, + 0xe990fd5a, 0x9e34d797, 0x2cf0b7d9, 0x022b8b51, + 0x96d5ac3a, 0x017da67d, 0xd1cf3ed6, 0x7c7d2d28, + 0x1f9f25cf, 0xadf2b89b, 0x5ad6b472, 0x5a88f54c, + 0xe029ac71, 0xe019a5e6, 0x47b0acfd, 0xed93fa9b, + 0xe8d3c48d, 0x283b57cc, 0xf8d56629, 0x79132e28, + 0x785f0191, 0xed756055, 0xf7960e44, 0xe3d35e8c, + 0x15056dd4, 0x88f46dba, 0x03a16125, 0x0564f0bd, + 0xc3eb9e15, 0x3c9057a2, 0x97271aec, 0xa93a072a, + 0x1b3f6d9b, 0x1e6321f5, 0xf59c66fb, 0x26dcf319, + 0x7533d928, 0xb155fdf5, 0x03563482, 0x8aba3cbb, + 0x28517711, 0xc20ad9f8, 0xabcc5167, 0xccad925f, + 0x4de81751, 0x3830dc8e, 0x379d5862, 0x9320f991, + 0xea7a90c2, 0xfb3e7bce, 0x5121ce64, 0x774fbe32, + 0xa8b6e37e, 0xc3293d46, 0x48de5369, 0x6413e680, + 0xa2ae0810, 0xdd6db224, 0x69852dfd, 0x09072166, + 0xb39a460a, 0x6445c0dd, 0x586cdecf, 0x1c20c8ae, + 0x5bbef7dd, 0x1b588d40, 0xccd2017f, 0x6bb4e3bb, + 0xdda26a7e, 0x3a59ff45, 0x3e350a44, 0xbcb4cdd5, + 0x72eacea8, 0xfa6484bb, 0x8d6612ae, 0xbf3c6f47, + 0xd29be463, 0x542f5d9e, 0xaec2771b, 0xf64e6370, + 0x740e0d8d, 0xe75b1357, 0xf8721671, 0xaf537d5d, + 0x4040cb08, 0x4eb4e2cc, 0x34d2466a, 0x0115af84, + 0xe1b00428, 0x95983a1d, 0x06b89fb4, 0xce6ea048, + 0x6f3f3b82, 0x3520ab82, 0x011a1d4b, 0x277227f8, + 0x611560b1, 0xe7933fdc, 0xbb3a792b, 0x344525bd, + 0xa08839e1, 0x51ce794b, 0x2f32c9b7, 0xa01fbac9, + 0xe01cc87e, 0xbcc7d1f6, 0xcf0111c3, 0xa1e8aac7, + 0x1a908749, 0xd44fbd9a, 0xd0dadecb, 0xd50ada38, + 0x0339c32a, 0xc6913667, 0x8df9317c, 0xe0b12b4f, + 0xf79e59b7, 0x43f5bb3a, 0xf2d519ff, 0x27d9459c, + 0xbf97222c, 0x15e6fc2a, 0x0f91fc71, 0x9b941525, + 0xfae59361, 0xceb69ceb, 0xc2a86459, 0x12baa8d1, + 0xb6c1075e, 0xe3056a0c, 0x10d25065, 0xcb03a442, + 0xe0ec6e0e, 0x1698db3b, 0x4c98a0be, 0x3278e964, + 0x9f1f9532, 0xe0d392df, 0xd3a0342b, 0x8971f21e, + 0x1b0a7441, 0x4ba3348c, 0xc5be7120, 0xc37632d8, + 0xdf359f8d, 0x9b992f2e, 0xe60b6f47, 0x0fe3f11d, + 0xe54cda54, 0x1edad891, 0xce6279cf, 0xcd3e7e6f, + 0x1618b166, 0xfd2c1d05, 0x848fd2c5, 0xf6fb2299, + 0xf523f357, 0xa6327623, 0x93a83531, 0x56cccd02, + 0xacf08162, 0x5a75ebb5, 0x6e163697, 0x88d273cc, + 0xde966292, 0x81b949d0, 0x4c50901b, 0x71c65614, + 0xe6c6c7bd, 0x327a140a, 0x45e1d006, 0xc3f27b9a, + 0xc9aa53fd, 0x62a80f00, 0xbb25bfe2, 0x35bdd2f6, + 0x71126905, 0xb2040222, 0xb6cbcf7c, 0xcd769c2b, + 0x53113ec0, 0x1640e3d3, 0x38abbd60, 0x2547adf0, + 0xba38209c, 0xf746ce76, 0x77afa1c5, 0x20756060, + 0x85cbfe4e, 0x8ae88dd8, 0x7aaaf9b0, 0x4cf9aa7e, + 0x1948c25c, 0x02fb8a8c, 0x01c36ae4, 0xd6ebe1f9, + 0x90d4f869, 0xa65cdea0, 0x3f09252d, 0xc208e69f, + 0xb74e6132, 0xce77e25b, 0x578fdfe3, 0x3ac372e6 + } + }, { + 0x243f6a88, 0x85a308d3, 0x13198a2e, 0x03707344, + 0xa4093822, 0x299f31d0, 0x082efa98, 0xec4e6c89, + 0x452821e6, 0x38d01377, 0xbe5466cf, 0x34e90c6c, + 0xc0ac29b7, 0xc97c50dd, 0x3f84d5b5, 0xb5470917, + 0x9216d5d9, 0x8979fb1b + } +}; + +static unsigned char BF_itoa64[64 + 1] = + "./ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789"; + +static unsigned char BF_atoi64[0x60] = { + 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 0, 1, + 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, + 64, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, + 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, + 64, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, + 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64 +}; + +#define BF_safe_atoi64(dst, src) \ +{ \ + tmp = (unsigned char)(src); \ + if ((unsigned int)(tmp -= 0x20) >= 0x60) return -1; \ + tmp = BF_atoi64[tmp]; \ + if (tmp > 63) return -1; \ + (dst) = tmp; \ +} + +static int BF_decode(BF_word *dst, const char *src, int size) +{ + unsigned char *dptr = (unsigned char *)dst; + unsigned char *end = dptr + size; + const unsigned char *sptr = (const unsigned char *)src; + unsigned int tmp, c1, c2, c3, c4; + + do { + BF_safe_atoi64(c1, *sptr++); + BF_safe_atoi64(c2, *sptr++); + *dptr++ = (c1 << 2) | ((c2 & 0x30) >> 4); + if (dptr >= end) break; + + BF_safe_atoi64(c3, *sptr++); + *dptr++ = ((c2 & 0x0F) << 4) | ((c3 & 0x3C) >> 2); + if (dptr >= end) break; + + BF_safe_atoi64(c4, *sptr++); + *dptr++ = ((c3 & 0x03) << 6) | c4; + } while (dptr < end); + + return 0; +} + +static void BF_encode(char *dst, const BF_word *src, int size) +{ + const unsigned char *sptr = (const unsigned char *)src; + const unsigned char *end = sptr + size; + unsigned char *dptr = (unsigned char *)dst; + unsigned int c1, c2; + + do { + c1 = *sptr++; + *dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c1 >> 2]; + c1 = (c1 & 0x03) << 4; + if (sptr >= end) { + *dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c1]; + break; + } + + c2 = *sptr++; + c1 |= c2 >> 4; + *dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c1]; + c1 = (c2 & 0x0f) << 2; + if (sptr >= end) { + *dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c1]; + break; + } + + c2 = *sptr++; + c1 |= c2 >> 6; + *dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c1]; + *dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c2 & 0x3f]; + } while (sptr < end); +} + +static void BF_swap(BF_word *x, int count) +{ + static int endianness_check = 1; + char *is_little_endian = (char *)&endianness_check; + BF_word tmp; + + if (*is_little_endian) + do { + tmp = *x; + tmp = (tmp << 16) | (tmp >> 16); + *x++ = ((tmp & 0x00FF00FF) << 8) | ((tmp >> 8) & 0x00FF00FF); + } while (--count); +} + +#if BF_SCALE +/* Architectures which can shift addresses left by 2 bits with no extra cost */ +#define BF_ROUND(L, R, N) \ + tmp1 = L & 0xFF; \ + tmp2 = L >> 8; \ + tmp2 &= 0xFF; \ + tmp3 = L >> 16; \ + tmp3 &= 0xFF; \ + tmp4 = L >> 24; \ + tmp1 = data.ctx.S[3][tmp1]; \ + tmp2 = data.ctx.S[2][tmp2]; \ + tmp3 = data.ctx.S[1][tmp3]; \ + tmp3 += data.ctx.S[0][tmp4]; \ + tmp3 ^= tmp2; \ + R ^= data.ctx.P[N + 1]; \ + tmp3 += tmp1; \ + R ^= tmp3; +#else +/* Architectures with no complicated addressing modes supported */ +#define BF_INDEX(S, i) \ + (*((BF_word *)(((unsigned char *)S) + (i)))) +#define BF_ROUND(L, R, N) \ + tmp1 = L & 0xFF; \ + tmp1 <<= 2; \ + tmp2 = L >> 6; \ + tmp2 &= 0x3FC; \ + tmp3 = L >> 14; \ + tmp3 &= 0x3FC; \ + tmp4 = L >> 22; \ + tmp4 &= 0x3FC; \ + tmp1 = BF_INDEX(data.ctx.S[3], tmp1); \ + tmp2 = BF_INDEX(data.ctx.S[2], tmp2); \ + tmp3 = BF_INDEX(data.ctx.S[1], tmp3); \ + tmp3 += BF_INDEX(data.ctx.S[0], tmp4); \ + tmp3 ^= tmp2; \ + R ^= data.ctx.P[N + 1]; \ + tmp3 += tmp1; \ + R ^= tmp3; +#endif + +/* + * Encrypt one block, BF_N is hardcoded here. + */ +#define BF_ENCRYPT \ + L ^= data.ctx.P[0]; \ + BF_ROUND(L, R, 0); \ + BF_ROUND(R, L, 1); \ + BF_ROUND(L, R, 2); \ + BF_ROUND(R, L, 3); \ + BF_ROUND(L, R, 4); \ + BF_ROUND(R, L, 5); \ + BF_ROUND(L, R, 6); \ + BF_ROUND(R, L, 7); \ + BF_ROUND(L, R, 8); \ + BF_ROUND(R, L, 9); \ + BF_ROUND(L, R, 10); \ + BF_ROUND(R, L, 11); \ + BF_ROUND(L, R, 12); \ + BF_ROUND(R, L, 13); \ + BF_ROUND(L, R, 14); \ + BF_ROUND(R, L, 15); \ + tmp4 = R; \ + R = L; \ + L = tmp4 ^ data.ctx.P[BF_N + 1]; + +#if BF_ASM +#define BF_body() \ + _BF_body_r(&data.ctx); +#else +#define BF_body() \ + L = R = 0; \ + ptr = data.ctx.P; \ + do { \ + ptr += 2; \ + BF_ENCRYPT; \ + *(ptr - 2) = L; \ + *(ptr - 1) = R; \ + } while (ptr < &data.ctx.P[BF_N + 2]); \ +\ + ptr = data.ctx.S[0]; \ + do { \ + ptr += 2; \ + BF_ENCRYPT; \ + *(ptr - 2) = L; \ + *(ptr - 1) = R; \ + } while (ptr < &data.ctx.S[3][0xFF]); +#endif + +static void BF_set_key(const char *key, BF_key expanded, BF_key initial, + unsigned char flags) +{ + const char *ptr = key; + unsigned int bug, i, j; + BF_word safety, sign, diff, tmp[2]; + +/* + * There was a sign extension bug in older revisions of this function. While + * we would have liked to simply fix the bug and move on, we have to provide + * a backwards compatibility feature (essentially the bug) for some systems and + * a safety measure for some others. The latter is needed because for certain + * multiple inputs to the buggy algorithm there exist easily found inputs to + * the correct algorithm that produce the same hash. Thus, we optionally + * deviate from the correct algorithm just enough to avoid such collisions. + * While the bug itself affected the majority of passwords containing + * characters with the 8th bit set (although only a percentage of those in a + * collision-producing way), the anti-collision safety measure affects + * only a subset of passwords containing the '\xff' character (not even all of + * those passwords, just some of them). This character is not found in valid + * UTF-8 sequences and is rarely used in popular 8-bit character encodings. + * Thus, the safety measure is unlikely to cause much annoyance, and is a + * reasonable tradeoff to use when authenticating against existing hashes that + * are not reliably known to have been computed with the correct algorithm. + * + * We use an approach that tries to minimize side-channel leaks of password + * information - that is, we mostly use fixed-cost bitwise operations instead + * of branches or table lookups. (One conditional branch based on password + * length remains. It is not part of the bug aftermath, though, and is + * difficult and possibly unreasonable to avoid given the use of C strings by + * the caller, which results in similar timing leaks anyway.) + * + * For actual implementation, we set an array index in the variable "bug" + * (0 means no bug, 1 means sign extension bug emulation) and a flag in the + * variable "safety" (bit 16 is set when the safety measure is requested). + * Valid combinations of settings are: + * + * Prefix "$2a$": bug = 0, safety = 0x10000 + * Prefix "$2b$": bug = 0, safety = 0 + * Prefix "$2x$": bug = 1, safety = 0 + * Prefix "$2y$": bug = 0, safety = 0 + */ + bug = (unsigned int)flags & 1; + safety = ((BF_word)flags & 2) << 15; + + sign = diff = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < BF_N + 2; i++) { + tmp[0] = tmp[1] = 0; + for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) { + tmp[0] <<= 8; + tmp[0] |= (unsigned char)*ptr; /* correct */ + tmp[1] <<= 8; + tmp[1] |= (BF_word_signed)(signed char)*ptr; /* bug */ +/* + * Sign extension in the first char has no effect - nothing to overwrite yet, + * and those extra 24 bits will be fully shifted out of the 32-bit word. For + * chars 2, 3, 4 in each four-char block, we set bit 7 of "sign" if sign + * extension in tmp[1] occurs. Once this flag is set, it remains set. + */ + if (j) + sign |= tmp[1] & 0x80; + if (!*ptr) + ptr = key; + else + ptr++; + } + diff |= tmp[0] ^ tmp[1]; /* Non-zero on any differences */ + + expanded[i] = tmp[bug]; + initial[i] = BF_init_state.P[i] ^ tmp[bug]; + } + +/* + * At this point, "diff" is zero iff the correct and buggy algorithms produced + * exactly the same result. If so and if "sign" is non-zero, which indicates + * that there was a non-benign sign extension, this means that we have a + * collision between the correctly computed hash for this password and a set of + * passwords that could be supplied to the buggy algorithm. Our safety measure + * is meant to protect from such many-buggy to one-correct collisions, by + * deviating from the correct algorithm in such cases. Let's check for this. + */ + diff |= diff >> 16; /* still zero iff exact match */ + diff &= 0xffff; /* ditto */ + diff += 0xffff; /* bit 16 set iff "diff" was non-zero (on non-match) */ + sign <<= 9; /* move the non-benign sign extension flag to bit 16 */ + sign &= ~diff & safety; /* action needed? */ + +/* + * If we have determined that we need to deviate from the correct algorithm, + * flip bit 16 in initial expanded key. (The choice of 16 is arbitrary, but + * let's stick to it now. It came out of the approach we used above, and it's + * not any worse than any other choice we could make.) + * + * It is crucial that we don't do the same to the expanded key used in the main + * Eksblowfish loop. By doing it to only one of these two, we deviate from a + * state that could be directly specified by a password to the buggy algorithm + * (and to the fully correct one as well, but that's a side-effect). + */ + initial[0] ^= sign; +} + +static const unsigned char flags_by_subtype[26] = + {2, 4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 4, 0}; + +static char *BF_crypt(const char *key, const char *setting, + char *output, int size, + BF_word min) +{ +#if BF_ASM + extern void _BF_body_r(BF_ctx *ctx); +#endif + struct { + BF_ctx ctx; + BF_key expanded_key; + union { + BF_word salt[4]; + BF_word output[6]; + } binary; + } data; + BF_word L, R; + BF_word tmp1, tmp2, tmp3, tmp4; + BF_word *ptr; + BF_word count; + int i; + + if (size < 7 + 22 + 31 + 1) { + __set_errno(ERANGE); + return NULL; + } + + if (setting[0] != '$' || + setting[1] != '2' || + setting[2] < 'a' || setting[2] > 'z' || + !flags_by_subtype[(unsigned int)(unsigned char)setting[2] - 'a'] || + setting[3] != '$' || + setting[4] < '0' || setting[4] > '3' || + setting[5] < '0' || setting[5] > '9' || + (setting[4] == '3' && setting[5] > '1') || + setting[6] != '$') { + __set_errno(EINVAL); + return NULL; + } + + count = (BF_word)1 << ((setting[4] - '0') * 10 + (setting[5] - '0')); + if (count < min || BF_decode(data.binary.salt, &setting[7], 16)) { + __set_errno(EINVAL); + return NULL; + } + BF_swap(data.binary.salt, 4); + + BF_set_key(key, data.expanded_key, data.ctx.P, + flags_by_subtype[(unsigned int)(unsigned char)setting[2] - 'a']); + + memcpy(data.ctx.S, BF_init_state.S, sizeof(data.ctx.S)); + + L = R = 0; + for (i = 0; i < BF_N + 2; i += 2) { + L ^= data.binary.salt[i & 2]; + R ^= data.binary.salt[(i & 2) + 1]; + BF_ENCRYPT; + data.ctx.P[i] = L; + data.ctx.P[i + 1] = R; + } + + ptr = data.ctx.S[0]; + do { + ptr += 4; + L ^= data.binary.salt[(BF_N + 2) & 3]; + R ^= data.binary.salt[(BF_N + 3) & 3]; + BF_ENCRYPT; + *(ptr - 4) = L; + *(ptr - 3) = R; + + L ^= data.binary.salt[(BF_N + 4) & 3]; + R ^= data.binary.salt[(BF_N + 5) & 3]; + BF_ENCRYPT; + *(ptr - 2) = L; + *(ptr - 1) = R; + } while (ptr < &data.ctx.S[3][0xFF]); + + do { + int done; + + for (i = 0; i < BF_N + 2; i += 2) { + data.ctx.P[i] ^= data.expanded_key[i]; + data.ctx.P[i + 1] ^= data.expanded_key[i + 1]; + } + + done = 0; + do { + BF_body(); + if (done) + break; + done = 1; + + tmp1 = data.binary.salt[0]; + tmp2 = data.binary.salt[1]; + tmp3 = data.binary.salt[2]; + tmp4 = data.binary.salt[3]; + for (i = 0; i < BF_N; i += 4) { + data.ctx.P[i] ^= tmp1; + data.ctx.P[i + 1] ^= tmp2; + data.ctx.P[i + 2] ^= tmp3; + data.ctx.P[i + 3] ^= tmp4; + } + data.ctx.P[16] ^= tmp1; + data.ctx.P[17] ^= tmp2; + } while (1); + } while (--count); + + for (i = 0; i < 6; i += 2) { + L = BF_magic_w[i]; + R = BF_magic_w[i + 1]; + + count = 64; + do { + BF_ENCRYPT; + } while (--count); + + data.binary.output[i] = L; + data.binary.output[i + 1] = R; + } + + memcpy(output, setting, 7 + 22 - 1); + output[7 + 22 - 1] = BF_itoa64[(int) + BF_atoi64[(int)setting[7 + 22 - 1] - 0x20] & 0x30]; + +/* This has to be bug-compatible with the original implementation, so + * only encode 23 of the 24 bytes. :-) */ + BF_swap(data.binary.output, 6); + BF_encode(&output[7 + 22], data.binary.output, 23); + output[7 + 22 + 31] = '\0'; + + return output; +} + +int _crypt_output_magic(const char *setting, char *output, int size) +{ + if (size < 3) + return -1; + + output[0] = '*'; + output[1] = '0'; + output[2] = '\0'; + + if (setting[0] == '*' && setting[1] == '0') + output[1] = '1'; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Please preserve the runtime self-test. It serves two purposes at once: + * + * 1. We really can't afford the risk of producing incompatible hashes e.g. + * when there's something like gcc bug 26587 again, whereas an application or + * library integrating this code might not also integrate our external tests or + * it might not run them after every build. Even if it does, the miscompile + * might only occur on the production build, but not on a testing build (such + * as because of different optimization settings). It is painful to recover + * from incorrectly-computed hashes - merely fixing whatever broke is not + * enough. Thus, a proactive measure like this self-test is needed. + * + * 2. We don't want to leave sensitive data from our actual password hash + * computation on the stack or in registers. Previous revisions of the code + * would do explicit cleanups, but simply running the self-test after hash + * computation is more reliable. + * + * The performance cost of this quick self-test is around 0.6% at the "$2a$08" + * setting. + */ +char *_crypt_blowfish_rn(const char *key, const char *setting, + char *output, int size) +{ + const char *test_key = "8b \xd0\xc1\xd2\xcf\xcc\xd8"; + const char *test_setting = "$2a$00$abcdefghijklmnopqrstuu"; + static const char * const test_hashes[2] = + {"i1D709vfamulimlGcq0qq3UvuUasvEa\0\x55", /* 'a', 'b', 'y' */ + "VUrPmXD6q/nVSSp7pNDhCR9071IfIRe\0\x55"}; /* 'x' */ + const char *test_hash = test_hashes[0]; + char *retval; + const char *p; + int save_errno, ok; + struct { + char s[7 + 22 + 1]; + char o[7 + 22 + 31 + 1 + 1 + 1]; + } buf; + +/* Hash the supplied password */ + _crypt_output_magic(setting, output, size); + retval = BF_crypt(key, setting, output, size, 16); + save_errno = errno; + +/* + * Do a quick self-test. It is important that we make both calls to BF_crypt() + * from the same scope such that they likely use the same stack locations, + * which makes the second call overwrite the first call's sensitive data on the + * stack and makes it more likely that any alignment related issues would be + * detected by the self-test. + */ + memcpy(buf.s, test_setting, sizeof(buf.s)); + if (retval) { + unsigned int flags = flags_by_subtype[ + (unsigned int)(unsigned char)setting[2] - 'a']; + test_hash = test_hashes[flags & 1]; + buf.s[2] = setting[2]; + } + memset(buf.o, 0x55, sizeof(buf.o)); + buf.o[sizeof(buf.o) - 1] = 0; + p = BF_crypt(test_key, buf.s, buf.o, sizeof(buf.o) - (1 + 1), 1); + + ok = (p == buf.o && + !memcmp(p, buf.s, 7 + 22) && + !memcmp(p + (7 + 22), test_hash, 31 + 1 + 1 + 1)); + + { + const char *k = "\xff\xa3" "34" "\xff\xff\xff\xa3" "345"; + BF_key ae, ai, ye, yi; + BF_set_key(k, ae, ai, 2); /* $2a$ */ + BF_set_key(k, ye, yi, 4); /* $2y$ */ + ai[0] ^= 0x10000; /* undo the safety (for comparison) */ + ok = ok && ai[0] == 0xdb9c59bc && ye[17] == 0x33343500 && + !memcmp(ae, ye, sizeof(ae)) && + !memcmp(ai, yi, sizeof(ai)); + } + + __set_errno(save_errno); + if (ok) + return retval; + +/* Should not happen */ + _crypt_output_magic(setting, output, size); + __set_errno(EINVAL); /* pretend we don't support this hash type */ + return NULL; +} + +char *_crypt_gensalt_blowfish_rn(const char *prefix, unsigned long count, + const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size) +{ + if (size < 16 || output_size < 7 + 22 + 1 || + (count && (count < 4 || count > 31)) || + prefix[0] != '$' || prefix[1] != '2' || + (prefix[2] != 'a' && prefix[2] != 'b' && prefix[2] != 'y')) { + if (output_size > 0) output[0] = '\0'; + __set_errno((output_size < 7 + 22 + 1) ? ERANGE : EINVAL); + return NULL; + } + + if (!count) count = 5; + + output[0] = '$'; + output[1] = '2'; + output[2] = prefix[2]; + output[3] = '$'; + output[4] = '0' + count / 10; + output[5] = '0' + count % 10; + output[6] = '$'; + + BF_encode(&output[7], (const BF_word *)input, 16); + output[7 + 22] = '\0'; + + return output; +} diff --git a/crypt/crypt_blowfish.h b/crypt/crypt_blowfish.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2ee0d8c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypt/crypt_blowfish.h @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +/* + * Written by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> in 2000-2011. + * No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public + * domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software + * in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is + * Copyright (c) 2000-2011 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the + * general public under the following terms: + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted. + * + * There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied. + * + * See crypt_blowfish.c for more information. + */ + +#ifndef _CRYPT_BLOWFISH_H +#define _CRYPT_BLOWFISH_H + +extern int _crypt_output_magic(const char *setting, char *output, int size); +extern char *_crypt_blowfish_rn(const char *key, const char *setting, + char *output, int size); +extern char *_crypt_gensalt_blowfish_rn(const char *prefix, + unsigned long count, + const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size); + +#endif diff --git a/crypt/crypt_gensalt.c b/crypt/crypt_gensalt.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..73c15a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypt/crypt_gensalt.c @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@ +/* + * Written by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> in 2000-2011. + * No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public + * domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software + * in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is + * Copyright (c) 2000-2011 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the + * general public under the following terms: + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted. + * + * There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied. + * + * See crypt_blowfish.c for more information. + * + * This file contains salt generation functions for the traditional and + * other common crypt(3) algorithms, except for bcrypt which is defined + * entirely in crypt_blowfish.c. + */ + +#include <string.h> + +#include <errno.h> +#ifndef __set_errno +#define __set_errno(val) errno = (val) +#endif + +/* Just to make sure the prototypes match the actual definitions */ +#include "crypt_gensalt.h" + +unsigned char _crypt_itoa64[64 + 1] = + "./0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"; + +char *_crypt_gensalt_traditional_rn(const char *prefix, unsigned long count, + const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size) +{ + (void) prefix; + + if (size < 2 || output_size < 2 + 1 || (count && count != 25)) { + if (output_size > 0) output[0] = '\0'; + __set_errno((output_size < 2 + 1) ? ERANGE : EINVAL); + return NULL; + } + + output[0] = _crypt_itoa64[(unsigned int)input[0] & 0x3f]; + output[1] = _crypt_itoa64[(unsigned int)input[1] & 0x3f]; + output[2] = '\0'; + + return output; +} + +char *_crypt_gensalt_extended_rn(const char *prefix, unsigned long count, + const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size) +{ + unsigned long value; + + (void) prefix; + +/* Even iteration counts make it easier to detect weak DES keys from a look + * at the hash, so they should be avoided */ + if (size < 3 || output_size < 1 + 4 + 4 + 1 || + (count && (count > 0xffffff || !(count & 1)))) { + if (output_size > 0) output[0] = '\0'; + __set_errno((output_size < 1 + 4 + 4 + 1) ? ERANGE : EINVAL); + return NULL; + } + + if (!count) count = 725; + + output[0] = '_'; + output[1] = _crypt_itoa64[count & 0x3f]; + output[2] = _crypt_itoa64[(count >> 6) & 0x3f]; + output[3] = _crypt_itoa64[(count >> 12) & 0x3f]; + output[4] = _crypt_itoa64[(count >> 18) & 0x3f]; + value = (unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[0] | + ((unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[1] << 8) | + ((unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[2] << 16); + output[5] = _crypt_itoa64[value & 0x3f]; + output[6] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 6) & 0x3f]; + output[7] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 12) & 0x3f]; + output[8] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 18) & 0x3f]; + output[9] = '\0'; + + return output; +} + +char *_crypt_gensalt_md5_rn(const char *prefix, unsigned long count, + const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size) +{ + unsigned long value; + + (void) prefix; + + if (size < 3 || output_size < 3 + 4 + 1 || (count && count != 1000)) { + if (output_size > 0) output[0] = '\0'; + __set_errno((output_size < 3 + 4 + 1) ? ERANGE : EINVAL); + return NULL; + } + + output[0] = '$'; + output[1] = '1'; + output[2] = '$'; + value = (unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[0] | + ((unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[1] << 8) | + ((unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[2] << 16); + output[3] = _crypt_itoa64[value & 0x3f]; + output[4] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 6) & 0x3f]; + output[5] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 12) & 0x3f]; + output[6] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 18) & 0x3f]; + output[7] = '\0'; + + if (size >= 6 && output_size >= 3 + 4 + 4 + 1) { + value = (unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[3] | + ((unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[4] << 8) | + ((unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[5] << 16); + output[7] = _crypt_itoa64[value & 0x3f]; + output[8] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 6) & 0x3f]; + output[9] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 12) & 0x3f]; + output[10] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 18) & 0x3f]; + output[11] = '\0'; + } + + return output; +} diff --git a/crypt/crypt_gensalt.h b/crypt/crypt_gensalt.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..457bbfe --- /dev/null +++ b/crypt/crypt_gensalt.h @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +/* + * Written by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> in 2000-2011. + * No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public + * domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software + * in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is + * Copyright (c) 2000-2011 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the + * general public under the following terms: + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted. + * + * There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied. + * + * See crypt_blowfish.c for more information. + */ + +#ifndef _CRYPT_GENSALT_H +#define _CRYPT_GENSALT_H + +extern unsigned char _crypt_itoa64[]; +extern char *_crypt_gensalt_traditional_rn(const char *prefix, + unsigned long count, + const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size); +extern char *_crypt_gensalt_extended_rn(const char *prefix, + unsigned long count, + const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size); +extern char *_crypt_gensalt_md5_rn(const char *prefix, unsigned long count, + const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size); + +#endif diff --git a/crypt/ow-crypt.h b/crypt/ow-crypt.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2e48794 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypt/ow-crypt.h @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +/* + * Written by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> in 2000-2011. + * No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public + * domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software + * in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is + * Copyright (c) 2000-2011 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the + * general public under the following terms: + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted. + * + * There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied. + * + * See crypt_blowfish.c for more information. + */ + +#ifndef _OW_CRYPT_H +#define _OW_CRYPT_H + +#ifndef __GNUC__ +#undef __const +#define __const const +#endif + +#ifndef __SKIP_GNU +extern char *crypt(__const char *key, __const char *setting); +extern char *crypt_r(__const char *key, __const char *setting, void *data); +#endif + +#ifndef __SKIP_OW +extern char *crypt_rn(__const char *key, __const char *setting, + void *data, int size); +extern char *crypt_ra(__const char *key, __const char *setting, + void **data, int *size); +extern char *crypt_gensalt(__const char *prefix, unsigned long count, + __const char *input, int size); +extern char *crypt_gensalt_rn(__const char *prefix, unsigned long count, + __const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size); +extern char *crypt_gensalt_ra(__const char *prefix, unsigned long count, + __const char *input, int size); +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/crypt/wrapper.c b/crypt/wrapper.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1e49c90 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypt/wrapper.c @@ -0,0 +1,551 @@ +/* + * Written by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> in 2000-2014. + * No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public + * domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software + * in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is + * Copyright (c) 2000-2014 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the + * general public under the following terms: + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted. + * + * There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied. + * + * See crypt_blowfish.c for more information. + */ + +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <errno.h> +#ifndef __set_errno +#define __set_errno(val) errno = (val) +#endif + +#ifdef TEST +#include <stdio.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <signal.h> +#include <time.h> +#include <sys/time.h> +#include <sys/times.h> +#ifdef TEST_THREADS +#include <pthread.h> +#endif +#endif + +#define CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE (7 + 22 + 31 + 1) +#define CRYPT_GENSALT_OUTPUT_SIZE (7 + 22 + 1) + +#if defined(__GLIBC__) && defined(_LIBC) +#define __SKIP_GNU +#endif +#include "ow-crypt.h" + +#include "crypt_blowfish.h" +#include "crypt_gensalt.h" + +#if defined(__GLIBC__) && defined(_LIBC) +/* crypt.h from glibc-crypt-2.1 will define struct crypt_data for us */ +#include "crypt.h" +extern char *__md5_crypt_r(const char *key, const char *salt, + char *buffer, int buflen); +/* crypt-entry.c needs to be patched to define __des_crypt_r rather than + * __crypt_r, and not define crypt_r and crypt at all */ +extern char *__des_crypt_r(const char *key, const char *salt, + struct crypt_data *data); +extern struct crypt_data _ufc_foobar; +#endif + +static int _crypt_data_alloc(void **data, int *size, int need) +{ + void *updated; + + if (*data && *size >= need) return 0; + + updated = realloc(*data, need); + + if (!updated) { +#ifndef __GLIBC__ + /* realloc(3) on glibc sets errno, so we don't need to bother */ + __set_errno(ENOMEM); +#endif + return -1; + } + +#if defined(__GLIBC__) && defined(_LIBC) + if (need >= sizeof(struct crypt_data)) + ((struct crypt_data *)updated)->initialized = 0; +#endif + + *data = updated; + *size = need; + + return 0; +} + +static char *_crypt_retval_magic(char *retval, const char *setting, + char *output, int size) +{ + if (retval) + return retval; + + if (_crypt_output_magic(setting, output, size)) + return NULL; /* shouldn't happen */ + + return output; +} + +#if defined(__GLIBC__) && defined(_LIBC) +/* + * Applications may re-use the same instance of struct crypt_data without + * resetting the initialized field in order to let crypt_r() skip some of + * its initialization code. Thus, it is important that our multiple hashing + * algorithms either don't conflict with each other in their use of the + * data area or reset the initialized field themselves whenever required. + * Currently, the hashing algorithms simply have no conflicts: the first + * field of struct crypt_data is the 128-byte large DES key schedule which + * __des_crypt_r() calculates each time it is called while the two other + * hashing algorithms use less than 128 bytes of the data area. + */ + +char *__crypt_rn(__const char *key, __const char *setting, + void *data, int size) +{ + if (setting[0] == '$' && setting[1] == '2') + return _crypt_blowfish_rn(key, setting, (char *)data, size); + if (setting[0] == '$' && setting[1] == '1') + return __md5_crypt_r(key, setting, (char *)data, size); + if (setting[0] == '$' || setting[0] == '_') { + __set_errno(EINVAL); + return NULL; + } + if (size >= sizeof(struct crypt_data)) + return __des_crypt_r(key, setting, (struct crypt_data *)data); + __set_errno(ERANGE); + return NULL; +} + +char *__crypt_ra(__const char *key, __const char *setting, + void **data, int *size) +{ + if (setting[0] == '$' && setting[1] == '2') { + if (_crypt_data_alloc(data, size, CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE)) + return NULL; + return _crypt_blowfish_rn(key, setting, (char *)*data, *size); + } + if (setting[0] == '$' && setting[1] == '1') { + if (_crypt_data_alloc(data, size, CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE)) + return NULL; + return __md5_crypt_r(key, setting, (char *)*data, *size); + } + if (setting[0] == '$' || setting[0] == '_') { + __set_errno(EINVAL); + return NULL; + } + if (_crypt_data_alloc(data, size, sizeof(struct crypt_data))) + return NULL; + return __des_crypt_r(key, setting, (struct crypt_data *)*data); +} + +char *__crypt_r(__const char *key, __const char *setting, + struct crypt_data *data) +{ + return _crypt_retval_magic( + __crypt_rn(key, setting, data, sizeof(*data)), + setting, (char *)data, sizeof(*data)); +} + +char *__crypt(__const char *key, __const char *setting) +{ + return _crypt_retval_magic( + __crypt_rn(key, setting, &_ufc_foobar, sizeof(_ufc_foobar)), + setting, (char *)&_ufc_foobar, sizeof(_ufc_foobar)); +} +#else +char *crypt_rn(const char *key, const char *setting, void *data, int size) +{ + return _crypt_blowfish_rn(key, setting, (char *)data, size); +} + +char *crypt_ra(const char *key, const char *setting, + void **data, int *size) +{ + if (_crypt_data_alloc(data, size, CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE)) + return NULL; + return _crypt_blowfish_rn(key, setting, (char *)*data, *size); +} + +char *crypt_r(const char *key, const char *setting, void *data) +{ + return _crypt_retval_magic( + crypt_rn(key, setting, data, CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE), + setting, (char *)data, CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE); +} + +char *crypt(const char *key, const char *setting) +{ + static char output[CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE]; + + return _crypt_retval_magic( + crypt_rn(key, setting, output, sizeof(output)), + setting, output, sizeof(output)); +} + +#define __crypt_gensalt_rn crypt_gensalt_rn +#define __crypt_gensalt_ra crypt_gensalt_ra +#define __crypt_gensalt crypt_gensalt +#endif + +char *__crypt_gensalt_rn(const char *prefix, unsigned long count, + const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size) +{ + char *(*use)(const char *_prefix, unsigned long _count, + const char *_input, int _size, + char *_output, int _output_size); + + /* This may be supported on some platforms in the future */ + if (!input) { + __set_errno(EINVAL); + return NULL; + } + + if (!strncmp(prefix, "$2a$", 4) || !strncmp(prefix, "$2b$", 4) || + !strncmp(prefix, "$2y$", 4)) + use = _crypt_gensalt_blowfish_rn; + else + if (!strncmp(prefix, "$1$", 3)) + use = _crypt_gensalt_md5_rn; + else + if (prefix[0] == '_') + use = _crypt_gensalt_extended_rn; + else + if (!prefix[0] || + (prefix[0] && prefix[1] && + memchr(_crypt_itoa64, prefix[0], 64) && + memchr(_crypt_itoa64, prefix[1], 64))) + use = _crypt_gensalt_traditional_rn; + else { + __set_errno(EINVAL); + return NULL; + } + + return use(prefix, count, input, size, output, output_size); +} + +char *__crypt_gensalt_ra(const char *prefix, unsigned long count, + const char *input, int size) +{ + char output[CRYPT_GENSALT_OUTPUT_SIZE]; + char *retval; + + retval = __crypt_gensalt_rn(prefix, count, + input, size, output, sizeof(output)); + + if (retval) { + retval = strdup(retval); +#ifndef __GLIBC__ + /* strdup(3) on glibc sets errno, so we don't need to bother */ + if (!retval) + __set_errno(ENOMEM); +#endif + } + + return retval; +} + +char *__crypt_gensalt(const char *prefix, unsigned long count, + const char *input, int size) +{ + static char output[CRYPT_GENSALT_OUTPUT_SIZE]; + + return __crypt_gensalt_rn(prefix, count, + input, size, output, sizeof(output)); +} + +#if defined(__GLIBC__) && defined(_LIBC) +weak_alias(__crypt_rn, crypt_rn) +weak_alias(__crypt_ra, crypt_ra) +weak_alias(__crypt_r, crypt_r) +weak_alias(__crypt, crypt) +weak_alias(__crypt_gensalt_rn, crypt_gensalt_rn) +weak_alias(__crypt_gensalt_ra, crypt_gensalt_ra) +weak_alias(__crypt_gensalt, crypt_gensalt) +weak_alias(crypt, fcrypt) +#endif + +#ifdef TEST +static const char *tests[][3] = { + {"$2a$05$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC.E5YPO9kmyuRGyh0XouQYb4YMJKvyOeW", + "U*U"}, + {"$2a$05$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC.VGOzA784oUp/Z0DY336zx7pLYAy0lwK", + "U*U*"}, + {"$2a$05$XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXOAcXxm9kjPGEMsLznoKqmqw7tc8WCx4a", + "U*U*U"}, + {"$2a$05$abcdefghijklmnopqrstuu5s2v8.iXieOjg/.AySBTTZIIVFJeBui", + "0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" + "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789" + "chars after 72 are ignored"}, + {"$2x$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.CE5elHaaO4EbggVDjb8P19RukzXSM3e", + "\xa3"}, + {"$2x$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.CE5elHaaO4EbggVDjb8P19RukzXSM3e", + "\xff\xff\xa3"}, + {"$2y$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.CE5elHaaO4EbggVDjb8P19RukzXSM3e", + "\xff\xff\xa3"}, + {"$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.nqd1wy.pTMdcvrRWxyiGL2eMz.2a85.", + "\xff\xff\xa3"}, + {"$2b$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.CE5elHaaO4EbggVDjb8P19RukzXSM3e", + "\xff\xff\xa3"}, + {"$2y$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.Sa7shbm4.OzKpvFnX1pQLmQW96oUlCq", + "\xa3"}, + {"$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.Sa7shbm4.OzKpvFnX1pQLmQW96oUlCq", + "\xa3"}, + {"$2b$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.Sa7shbm4.OzKpvFnX1pQLmQW96oUlCq", + "\xa3"}, + {"$2x$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.o./n25XVfn6oAPaUvHe.Csk4zRfsYPi", + "1\xa3" "345"}, + {"$2x$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.o./n25XVfn6oAPaUvHe.Csk4zRfsYPi", + "\xff\xa3" "345"}, + {"$2x$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.o./n25XVfn6oAPaUvHe.Csk4zRfsYPi", + "\xff\xa3" "34" "\xff\xff\xff\xa3" "345"}, + {"$2y$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.o./n25XVfn6oAPaUvHe.Csk4zRfsYPi", + "\xff\xa3" "34" "\xff\xff\xff\xa3" "345"}, + {"$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.ZC1JEJ8Z4gPfpe1JOr/oyPXTWl9EFd.", + "\xff\xa3" "34" "\xff\xff\xff\xa3" "345"}, + {"$2y$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.nRht2l/HRhr6zmCp9vYUvvsqynflf9e", + "\xff\xa3" "345"}, + {"$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.nRht2l/HRhr6zmCp9vYUvvsqynflf9e", + "\xff\xa3" "345"}, + {"$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.6IflQkJytoRVc1yuaNtHfiuq.FRlSIS", + "\xa3" "ab"}, + {"$2x$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.6IflQkJytoRVc1yuaNtHfiuq.FRlSIS", + "\xa3" "ab"}, + {"$2y$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.6IflQkJytoRVc1yuaNtHfiuq.FRlSIS", + "\xa3" "ab"}, + {"$2x$05$6bNw2HLQYeqHYyBfLMsv/OiwqTymGIGzFsA4hOTWebfehXHNprcAS", + "\xd1\x91"}, + {"$2x$05$6bNw2HLQYeqHYyBfLMsv/O9LIGgn8OMzuDoHfof8AQimSGfcSWxnS", + "\xd0\xc1\xd2\xcf\xcc\xd8"}, + {"$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.swQOIzjOiJ9GHEPuhEkvqrUyvWhEMx6", + "\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa" + "\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa" + "\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa" + "\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa" + "\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa" + "\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa" + "chars after 72 are ignored as usual"}, + {"$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.R9xrDjiycxMbQE2bp.vgqlYpW5wx2yy", + "\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55" + "\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55" + "\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55" + "\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55" + "\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55" + "\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55"}, + {"$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.9tQZzcJfm3uj2NvJ/n5xkhpqLrMpWCe", + "\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff" + "\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff" + "\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff" + "\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff" + "\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff" + "\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff"}, + {"$2a$05$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC.7uG0VCzI2bS7j6ymqJi9CdcdxiRTWNy", + ""}, + {"*0", "", "$2a$03$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC."}, + {"*0", "", "$2a$32$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC."}, + {"*0", "", "$2c$05$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC."}, + {"*0", "", "$2z$05$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC."}, + {"*0", "", "$2`$05$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC."}, + {"*0", "", "$2{$05$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC."}, + {"*1", "", "*0"}, + {NULL} +}; + +#define which tests[0] + +static volatile sig_atomic_t running; + +static void handle_timer(int signum) +{ + (void) signum; + running = 0; +} + +static void *run(void *arg) +{ + unsigned long count = 0; + int i = 0; + void *data = NULL; + int size = 0x12345678; + + do { + const char *hash = tests[i][0]; + const char *key = tests[i][1]; + const char *setting = tests[i][2]; + + if (!tests[++i][0]) + i = 0; + + if (setting && strlen(hash) < 30) /* not for benchmark */ + continue; + + if (strcmp(crypt_ra(key, hash, &data, &size), hash)) { + printf("%d: FAILED (crypt_ra/%d/%lu)\n", + (int)((char *)arg - (char *)0), i, count); + free(data); + return NULL; + } + count++; + } while (running); + + free(data); + return count + (char *)0; +} + +int main(void) +{ + struct itimerval it; + struct tms buf; + clock_t clk_tck, start_real, start_virtual, end_real, end_virtual; + unsigned long count; + void *data; + int size; + char *setting1, *setting2; + int i; +#ifdef TEST_THREADS + pthread_t t[TEST_THREADS]; + void *t_retval; +#endif + + data = NULL; + size = 0x12345678; + + for (i = 0; tests[i][0]; i++) { + const char *hash = tests[i][0]; + const char *key = tests[i][1]; + const char *setting = tests[i][2]; + const char *p; + int ok = !setting || strlen(hash) >= 30; + int o_size; + char s_buf[30], o_buf[61]; + if (!setting) { + memcpy(s_buf, hash, sizeof(s_buf) - 1); + s_buf[sizeof(s_buf) - 1] = 0; + setting = s_buf; + } + + __set_errno(0); + p = crypt(key, setting); + if ((!ok && !errno) || strcmp(p, hash)) { + printf("FAILED (crypt/%d)\n", i); + return 1; + } + + if (ok && strcmp(crypt(key, hash), hash)) { + printf("FAILED (crypt/%d)\n", i); + return 1; + } + + for (o_size = -1; o_size <= (int)sizeof(o_buf); o_size++) { + int ok_n = ok && o_size == (int)sizeof(o_buf); + const char *x = "abc"; + strcpy(o_buf, x); + if (o_size >= 3) { + x = "*0"; + if (setting[0] == '*' && setting[1] == '0') + x = "*1"; + } + __set_errno(0); + p = crypt_rn(key, setting, o_buf, o_size); + if ((ok_n && (!p || strcmp(p, hash))) || + (!ok_n && (!errno || p || strcmp(o_buf, x)))) { + printf("FAILED (crypt_rn/%d)\n", i); + return 1; + } + } + + __set_errno(0); + p = crypt_ra(key, setting, &data, &size); + if ((ok && (!p || strcmp(p, hash))) || + (!ok && (!errno || p || strcmp((char *)data, hash)))) { + printf("FAILED (crypt_ra/%d)\n", i); + return 1; + } + } + + setting1 = crypt_gensalt(which[0], 12, data, size); + if (!setting1 || strncmp(setting1, "$2a$12$", 7)) { + puts("FAILED (crypt_gensalt)\n"); + return 1; + } + + setting2 = crypt_gensalt_ra(setting1, 12, data, size); + if (strcmp(setting1, setting2)) { + puts("FAILED (crypt_gensalt_ra/1)\n"); + return 1; + } + + (*(char *)data)++; + setting1 = crypt_gensalt_ra(setting2, 12, data, size); + if (!strcmp(setting1, setting2)) { + puts("FAILED (crypt_gensalt_ra/2)\n"); + return 1; + } + + free(setting1); + free(setting2); + free(data); + +#if defined(_SC_CLK_TCK) || !defined(CLK_TCK) + clk_tck = sysconf(_SC_CLK_TCK); +#else + clk_tck = CLK_TCK; +#endif + + running = 1; + signal(SIGALRM, handle_timer); + + memset(&it, 0, sizeof(it)); + it.it_value.tv_sec = 5; + setitimer(ITIMER_REAL, &it, NULL); + + start_real = times(&buf); + start_virtual = buf.tms_utime + buf.tms_stime; + + count = (char *)run((char *)0) - (char *)0; + + end_real = times(&buf); + end_virtual = buf.tms_utime + buf.tms_stime; + if (end_virtual == start_virtual) end_virtual++; + + printf("%.1f c/s real, %.1f c/s virtual\n", + (float)count * clk_tck / (end_real - start_real), + (float)count * clk_tck / (end_virtual - start_virtual)); + +#ifdef TEST_THREADS + running = 1; + it.it_value.tv_sec = 60; + setitimer(ITIMER_REAL, &it, NULL); + start_real = times(&buf); + + for (i = 0; i < TEST_THREADS; i++) + if (pthread_create(&t[i], NULL, run, i + (char *)0)) { + perror("pthread_create"); + return 1; + } + + for (i = 0; i < TEST_THREADS; i++) { + if (pthread_join(t[i], &t_retval)) { + perror("pthread_join"); + continue; + } + if (!t_retval) continue; + count = (char *)t_retval - (char *)0; + end_real = times(&buf); + printf("%d: %.1f c/s real\n", i, + (float)count * clk_tck / (end_real - start_real)); + } +#endif + + return 0; +} +#endif diff --git a/crypt/x86.S b/crypt/x86.S new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b0f1cd2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypt/x86.S @@ -0,0 +1,203 @@ +/* + * Written by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> in 1998-2010. + * No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public + * domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software + * in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is + * Copyright (c) 1998-2010 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the + * general public under the following terms: + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted. + * + * There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied. + * + * See crypt_blowfish.c for more information. + */ + +#ifdef __i386__ + +#if defined(__OpenBSD__) && !defined(__ELF__) +#define UNDERSCORES +#define ALIGN_LOG +#endif + +#if defined(__CYGWIN32__) || defined(__MINGW32__) +#define UNDERSCORES +#endif + +#ifdef __DJGPP__ +#define UNDERSCORES +#define ALIGN_LOG +#endif + +#ifdef UNDERSCORES +#define _BF_body_r __BF_body_r +#endif + +#ifdef ALIGN_LOG +#define DO_ALIGN(log) .align (log) +#elif defined(DUMBAS) +#define DO_ALIGN(log) .align 1 << log +#else +#define DO_ALIGN(log) .align (1 << (log)) +#endif + +#define BF_FRAME 0x200 +#define ctx %esp + +#define BF_ptr (ctx) + +#define S(N, r) N+BF_FRAME(ctx,r,4) +#ifdef DUMBAS +#define P(N) 0x1000+N+N+N+N+BF_FRAME(ctx) +#else +#define P(N) 0x1000+4*N+BF_FRAME(ctx) +#endif + +/* + * This version of the assembly code is optimized primarily for the original + * Intel Pentium but is also careful to avoid partial register stalls on the + * Pentium Pro family of processors (tested up to Pentium III Coppermine). + * + * It is possible to do 15% faster on the Pentium Pro family and probably on + * many non-Intel x86 processors, but, unfortunately, that would make things + * twice slower for the original Pentium. + * + * An additional 2% speedup may be achieved with non-reentrant code. + */ + +#define L %esi +#define R %edi +#define tmp1 %eax +#define tmp1_lo %al +#define tmp2 %ecx +#define tmp2_hi %ch +#define tmp3 %edx +#define tmp3_lo %dl +#define tmp4 %ebx +#define tmp4_hi %bh +#define tmp5 %ebp + +.text + +#define BF_ROUND(L, R, N) \ + xorl L,tmp2; \ + xorl tmp1,tmp1; \ + movl tmp2,L; \ + shrl $16,tmp2; \ + movl L,tmp4; \ + movb tmp2_hi,tmp1_lo; \ + andl $0xFF,tmp2; \ + movb tmp4_hi,tmp3_lo; \ + andl $0xFF,tmp4; \ + movl S(0,tmp1),tmp1; \ + movl S(0x400,tmp2),tmp5; \ + addl tmp5,tmp1; \ + movl S(0x800,tmp3),tmp5; \ + xorl tmp5,tmp1; \ + movl S(0xC00,tmp4),tmp5; \ + addl tmp1,tmp5; \ + movl 4+P(N),tmp2; \ + xorl tmp5,R + +#define BF_ENCRYPT_START \ + BF_ROUND(L, R, 0); \ + BF_ROUND(R, L, 1); \ + BF_ROUND(L, R, 2); \ + BF_ROUND(R, L, 3); \ + BF_ROUND(L, R, 4); \ + BF_ROUND(R, L, 5); \ + BF_ROUND(L, R, 6); \ + BF_ROUND(R, L, 7); \ + BF_ROUND(L, R, 8); \ + BF_ROUND(R, L, 9); \ + BF_ROUND(L, R, 10); \ + BF_ROUND(R, L, 11); \ + BF_ROUND(L, R, 12); \ + BF_ROUND(R, L, 13); \ + BF_ROUND(L, R, 14); \ + BF_ROUND(R, L, 15); \ + movl BF_ptr,tmp5; \ + xorl L,tmp2; \ + movl P(17),L + +#define BF_ENCRYPT_END \ + xorl R,L; \ + movl tmp2,R + +DO_ALIGN(5) +.globl _BF_body_r +_BF_body_r: + movl 4(%esp),%eax + pushl %ebp + pushl %ebx + pushl %esi + pushl %edi + subl $BF_FRAME-8,%eax + xorl L,L + cmpl %esp,%eax + ja BF_die + xchgl %eax,%esp + xorl R,R + pushl %eax + leal 0x1000+BF_FRAME-4(ctx),%eax + movl 0x1000+BF_FRAME-4(ctx),tmp2 + pushl %eax + xorl tmp3,tmp3 +BF_loop_P: + BF_ENCRYPT_START + addl $8,tmp5 + BF_ENCRYPT_END + leal 0x1000+18*4+BF_FRAME(ctx),tmp1 + movl tmp5,BF_ptr + cmpl tmp5,tmp1 + movl L,-8(tmp5) + movl R,-4(tmp5) + movl P(0),tmp2 + ja BF_loop_P + leal BF_FRAME(ctx),tmp5 + xorl tmp3,tmp3 + movl tmp5,BF_ptr +BF_loop_S: + BF_ENCRYPT_START + BF_ENCRYPT_END + movl P(0),tmp2 + movl L,(tmp5) + movl R,4(tmp5) + BF_ENCRYPT_START + BF_ENCRYPT_END + movl P(0),tmp2 + movl L,8(tmp5) + movl R,12(tmp5) + BF_ENCRYPT_START + BF_ENCRYPT_END + movl P(0),tmp2 + movl L,16(tmp5) + movl R,20(tmp5) + BF_ENCRYPT_START + addl $32,tmp5 + BF_ENCRYPT_END + leal 0x1000+BF_FRAME(ctx),tmp1 + movl tmp5,BF_ptr + cmpl tmp5,tmp1 + movl P(0),tmp2 + movl L,-8(tmp5) + movl R,-4(tmp5) + ja BF_loop_S + movl 4(%esp),%esp + popl %edi + popl %esi + popl %ebx + popl %ebp + ret + +BF_die: +/* Oops, need to re-compile with a larger BF_FRAME. */ + hlt + jmp BF_die + +#endif + +#if defined(__ELF__) && defined(__linux__) +.section .note.GNU-stack,"",@progbits +#endif |